1. SCOPE ………………………………………………………………………………..2. REFERENCES 3
3. DEFINITIONS 4
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS …………………………………………………5. GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 6. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6.1 The Process Safety Discipline ……………………………………………6.2 Interaction with Other Engineering Disciplines 6.3 Approval 7. REVIEWS …………………………………………………………………………….7.1 Process Hazards Analyses (PHAs) 7.2 Consequence Analysis
7.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment ……………………………………………7.4 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Review 7.5 Other Process Safety Reviews 8. PLOT LAYOUT ……………………………………………………………………..9. FIRE PROTECTION AND PREVENTION 9.1 Detection Systems 9.2 Fire Alarms ………………………………………………………………………9.3 Fire Water Distribution And Delivery System 9.4 Fireproofing 10. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM …………………………………….11. RELIEF/FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN 12. SAFETY SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW 12.1 Project-Specific Standards and Specifications ………………………12.2 Review Process 13. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
APPENDIX
A Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process
Plant Buildings……………………………………………………………………….
1. Scope
The purpose of this document is to establish minimum safety and health criteria to be incorporated into the
engineering design for capital projects. This includes the execution of Process Safety related reviews as
well as the coordination of Process Safety issues among the Process and other engineering disciplines
during project execution. Within these guidelines the Project Manager, Engineering Manager, Process
Safety Specialist, and other responsible individuals can ensure that appropriate measures are taken to
optimize the reliability of the designed system. Universal adherence to this document will ensure that
appropriate safety features are included in the design by each discipline without needless duplication.
2. References
The design of this facility will be in full accordance with all applicable SABIC Engineering Standards and
other Saudi Government safety standards. In addition, full consideration will be given to industry-accepted
codes and standards, e.g. API, ASME, ASTM, NFPA, and UL as specified in SABIC corporate discipline
engineering standards. These shall include, but not be limited to the following:
NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code
NFPA 70 National Electric Code
NFPA 497A Classification of Class I Hazardous Locations – Electrical
NFPA 497B Classification of Class II Hazardous Locations – Electrical
NFPA 497M Manual for Classification of Gases, Vapors, Dusts for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 110 Emergency and Standby Power Systems
ISA S-84 Safety Instrumented Systems
NFPA 58 Storage and handling of LPG
NFPA 10 Portable Fire Extinguishers
NFPA 13 Sprinkler Systems, Installation
NFPA 14 Standpipe and Hose Systems
NFPA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code
NFPA 325 Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, and Volatile Solids
NFPA 77 Static Electricity
NFPA 78 Lightning Protection Code
NFPA 203M Roof Coverings and Roof Deck Construction
NFPA 220 Types of Building Construction
API RP 520 Design and Installation of Pressure Systems in Refineries
API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
API RP 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
API RP 752 Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings
API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
3. Definitions
For the purpose of understanding this standard, the following definitions apply.
Change. Modifications to a “process” which are procedural, mechanical or personnel related.
Incident. The loss of containment of material or energy.
Loss Prevention. A systematic and rational approach to maximizing the return for every project dollar
spent for compliance with Government Regulations, General Industry Standards and Facility Owner’s
Standards relating to management of risk..
Mitigate. Moderate or reduce the impact of an incident.
P&IDs. Process and instrument drawings.
Process (Procedure). A systematic procedure used to reach a goal.
Process (Chemical) A facility or portion of a facility which manufactures, uses or handles hazardous
chemicals.
Process Hazard Analysis. An organized, methodical approach to identify, and evaluate potential hazards
associated with process facilities. A PHA can identify, and sometimes propose preventative measures
before such incidents occur.
Process Hazards. Possibilities for serious injury or substantial property damage that can lead to events
such as explosions, fires, significant releases of toxic or corrosive materials, or environmental incidents.
Replacement-in-Kind. The substitution of one element of the facility with another element which serves as
a functional equivalent (meets the same requirements as the element being replaced).
Risk. A measure of the economic loss or human injury in terms of both the incident likelihood and the
magnitude of the loss or injury.
4. General Requirements
It is important to remember that the formalized techniques for safety reviews are used to audit designs
which already meet governing codes, standards, regulations, and engineering practices. Project Safety
Reviews are supplemental and provide a mechanism for the formal evaluation and verification of the
integrity of the design. Safety in design is paramount, and revolves around the following concepts:
a. Consistency in engineering to achieve low risk designs
b. Designs that follow standards
c. Adherence to regulations and codes
d. Designs that minimize engineering oversights and errors leading to changes
e. Satisfactory resolution of all risk mitigation issues
f. Safety in design according to a plan
5. General Philosophy
Special emphasis must be placed on developing an engineering design that fully considers the inherent
potential risks associated with a facility built to process flammable and hazardous gases and liquids. All
appropriate safety features will be incorporated into the design to minimize the potential for hazardous
events and to provide operations with the means to mitigate those events occurring in the facility.
Safety as a design criterion is incorporated into the conceptual and basic engineering design of each of the
process units as well as the utilities and offsites system. To ensure the consistent application of the safety
culture established for the project, each processing unit and selected utility and offsites systems will be
subjected to Hazard Analysis Reviews during Phase I engineering.
It is fully expected and required that the safety philosophy developed and applied to the basic engineering
phase of projects will be applied consistently through the detailed engineering and construction phase.
6. Roles and Responsibilities
6.1 The Process Safety Discipline
The Process Safety Engineering discipline is responsible for a number of tasks/activities required to
ensure adequate Process Safety in Design, including the following:
a. Layout reviews
b. Occupied building siting
c. Process Hazard Analysis (PHAs) – conceptual, preliminary, detailed
d. Review of specifications for safety impact
e. Development of safety related specifications (e.g. fixed fire fighting equipment, deluge systems,
smoke and gas detection systems, fire proofing, toxic gas systems)
f. Interface with disciplines on safety related matters
g. Safety Instrumented System (SIS) reviews
h. Coordination of efforts for safety related standards and regulations
i. Optimization of safety systems (gas detectors, fire monitors, deluge etc.)
j. Management of Change (MOC)
The Process Safety Lead will perform the day-to-day functions for the duration of the Project, and will
utilize a pool of off-task force Process Safety Specialists to perform required studies on an as-needed
basis. The Process Safety Lead may be a company function or a function of the contract/engineering
company reporting to the company. The Process Safety Lead may or may not be a full-time position on the
project. This decision is based on the requirements of the specific project.
In some cases, a completely decentralized approach to Process Safety in Design is a workable option.
More often, it is advisable to utilize a Process Safety Lead Engineer to coordinate Process Safety activities
across all disciplines and ensure that proper attention is paid to this important area. The Process Safety
Lead will generally be a Process Safety Specialist, although in some cases a Process Engineer or Project
Engineer may be used to coordinate Process Safety activities.
While the Process Safety Lead may facilitate some of the qualitative hazard identification studies
performed on the project, the detailed hazard evaluation studies will generally be performed by the
specialists.
6.2 Interaction with Other Engineering Disciplines
Process Safety in Design requires a contribution from engineers of all disciplines. For example: Piping
Engineers utilize equipment spacing guidelines to help ensure a safe plot layout; Electrical Engineers
perform hazardous area classification; Control Systems Engineers contribute to the design of gas
detection systems and safety interlocks; Civil/Structural Engineers are involved in the design of occupied
buildings that may be exposed to explosion hazards; and Process Engineers select appropriate
emergency relief scenarios and design relief and flare systems accordingly.
The day-to-day interaction with discipline engineers is perhaps the most important and most visible of the
functions of the full-time Process Safety Lead. This interaction will help ensure that the Process Safety
related responsibilities of each of the disciplines are properly attended to (e.g., in accordance with
applicable regulations and industry practices) and are executed in the most efficient manner possible.
Such interaction from Process Safety Specialists includes input on design deliverables (e.g., through
“squad check” reviews) such as P&IDs, electrical classification drawings, plot plans, flare system and relief
valve sizing cases, fire protection philosophy documentation, etc.
The Process Safety Lead will assist the discipline managers and lead engineers in achieving a safe design.
Lead engineers will be responsible for notifying the Process Safety Lead of hazards requiring
multi-disciplinary reviews; the Process Safety Lead will then organize the response. The pool of specialists
will be utilized as dictated by the requirements of the Project.
6.3 Approval
The authorization, tracking, and implementation of process safety actions, and approvals and squad
checks of process safety documents and specifications, are essential to the safety of the final facilities. A
method to accomplish and track these activities must be set up by the Project Team in a manner consistent
with project administration and document control policy.
The Project Team has the overall responsibility of ensuring that all of the applicable project activities
contained herein are successfully conducted, documented, and that the recommendations resulting from
process safety activities are fully addressed or incorporated into the new facilities prior to initial operation.
7. Reviews
7.1 Process Hazards Analyses (PHAs)
Process Hazards Analyses (PHAs) are used to identify, evaluate, and control hazards associated with
process facilities in a way that:
a. Uses an organized, methodical approach
b. Seeks and achieves multi-disciplined consensus
c. Documents results for future use in follow-up and training of personnel so that injuries and
process-related incidents are prevented
A PHA consists of two parts-a consequence analysis and a Process Hazard
Review (PHR). The PHA addresses:
a. The hazards of the process
b. Any relevant previous incident(s) that had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the
workplace
c. Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships,
such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases
d. Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls
e. Facility siting
f. Human factors
g. A qualitative evaluation of the range of possible safety and health effects of failure of controls on
employees in the workplace
Process hazards are potential exposures to serious injury or substantial property damage inherent and
unique to a process or operation. Typically, a PHA focuses on process hazards that can lead to major
episodic events, such as explosions, fires, significant releases of toxic/corrosive chemicals, and/or
environmental damage. However, PHA consideration must be given to all of the process hazards inherent
in each project. PHA studies must also include, but are not limited to, mechanical process hazards and
electrical process hazards. In addition, even powerhouses, electrical distribution systems, and other
non-manufacturing facilities, e.g., transportation, loading, unloading, bulk storage, etc., must be reviewed
for process hazards.
It is important to note that other review meetings, such as design reviews, safety and fire reviews,
environmental reviews, electrical classification reviews, etc., although interrelated to the subject of process
safety, must not be confused with PHAs. These other activities must be identified and documented
separately, so that each review receives the full attention it deserves.
Depending on the magnitude of the project more than one PHA may be required. The PHAs outlined
below vary in complexity based on different stages of the project. Major projects (unit expansion, new process) may require a Conceptual PHA, Preliminary Design PHA, Final Design PHA, and a PSSR. Other
projects may only require a Final Design PHA.
a. Level I – Conceptual PHA. A conceptual PHA is used to provide a preliminary safety analysis
while the basic process or plant design is still being developed. It provides an opportunity for
eliminating hazards while fundamental changes to the process can still be made. Detailed
engineering documents are not usually available at this phase and a What-If Checklist is a good
method to use. An Inherently Safer Design checklist can be useful at this stage as well.
b. Level II – Preliminary Design. Once the basic design is complete, a preliminary design PHA can
be done while there are still opportunities to make changes to the design. Documentation such as
P & IDs, electrical loop drawings and equipment data sheets should be available and used. The
What-If method, Creative What-IF, or What-If/Checklist may be chosen at this stage to verify safety
systems and issues, and document safeguards and mitigants for identified hazards, causes, and
consequences. Recommendations are made to further define requirements and to mitigate risk.
c. Level III – Final Design. When a complete set of P&IDs, electrical loop drawings, material safety
data sheets (MSDSs), and draft operating manuals are available, a full line-by-line PHA/HAZOP can
be done to verify and document safety systems, design parameters, and operating procedures as
safeguards and mitigants. Recommendations from prior PHAs are statused and documented. At
this stage, major safety requirements/issues should already have been identified and addressed in
prior PHAs. Recommendations and action items are generated where required.
7.2 Consequence Analysis
Special considerations, both in terms of design and in hazards analysis, must be given to the handling,
processing and transportation of highly hazardous materials that can cause harm off-site. Any material
capable of causing an acute, adverse health effect (e.g. death, serious injury, etc.) must be evaluated for
its off-site consequence potential. The project team must identify all chemicals and release scenarios that
could pose off-site hazards. If off-site risk situations are present in the project, as determined by the
consequence analysis, design considerations and alternatives will be required to be eliminate or reduce
the risk to acceptable levels.
Off-site risks, other than those posed by toxic vapors, require similar off-site risk considerations. Other
off-site hazards that may be present include thermal radiation, flammable liquids, vapor fires, explosions,
etc. Circumstances that could pose a significant off-site hazard include processing and storage.
Consequence analysis requirements in consideration to plant layout, unit and central control room siting,
etc. are covered in SABIC standard S-01-G-01, Safety Considerations for Play Layout.
7.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment
An important element of the safety assessment process is the quantitative risk assessment in which the
risk associated with the hazards that personnel are exposed to are quantified to determine whether the
project risk criteria has been met. The hazards typically analyzed include fire and explosions, structural
damage, and toxic releases. The determination of the appropriateness of conducting a QRA for a
particular application is the responsibility of the Process Safety Lead.
A hazard assessment will evaluate the design philosophy for a specific hazard or issue identified for the
project. Identified hazards will be documented and an assessment of the adequacy of the design and
safeguards given to support the case that the project risk criteria has been met. For design systems, any
deviations from industry standards or generally accepted practices will be noted and the safety study
assessment assumptions validated.
Process risk may be evaluated using qualitative as well as quantitative risk assessment methodologies for
potential major hazards such as pool fires, explosion, jet fires, smoke and gas ingress to buildings. These
studies will be conducted as needed with appropriate findings documented and reported.
The generation of the process risk contribution to an individual’s overall risk involves the modeling of fires
and explosions and a determination of their frequency and impact to personnel.
The Process Risk Quantitative Analysis will address the following issues:
a. An understanding of potential major hazards and risk contributing sources
b. Comparison of proposed design alternatives from a risk standpoint
c. A probabilistic basis for design of major elements such as the main blast wall, firewalls, structural
passive fire protection
d. Smoke and gas studies
e. A demonstration that design criteria are being met
In a safety case approach to quantifying risk, the personnel risk measure typically takes the form of
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) which is the probability of a particular individual incurring a fatal accident
in a year, and the Potential Loss of Life (PLL) which is the total potential loss of life calculated for all
personnel at a facility. The attainment of other quantitative risk goals are also verified involving safety
aspects of the design such as the survivability of emergency systems and central control facilities.
7.4 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Review
The purpose of a SIS review is to provide an early indication of whether any protective functions need to be
elevated to a safety function with a consequential requirement for a Safety Instrumented System(s) (SIS).
This is to allow a review of means to mitigate the need for a SIS and, if still required, to include it in the
estimate on a project. An additional benefit is to establish the concepts of control, protection, safety and
SIS with other disciplines.
The SIS review classifies events involving injuries and environmental impact where an interlock is present
or being considered. This initial classification can be done through the process hazards analysis
methodology, or as a separate activity. Events that involve financial loss only may be classified at this time
or delegated to another team for further analysis and final classification. The PHA team determines if the
impact of the event is limited to financial loss. An event is classified based on the level of risk involved.
The level of the risk is determined by considering the severity and frequency of the potential event.
Events should be identified as early as possible in the project cycle to provide opportunities to implement
inherently safe process designs that eliminate the events or provide safeguards that change the
classification for design purposes. In the process hazards analysis, some time and effort should be
expended to identify and classify events before the authorization estimate is complete. An early effort to
identify those events that will require SIS for design purposes will permit inclusion of the necessary
redundant sensors, control functions and final elements in the authorization estimate, thus avoiding
changes after authorization and transmittal of the production design basis.
SABIC standard X06S01 contains the SIS methodology and classification requirements.
7.5 Other Process Safety Reviews
The following is an alphabetized list of potential safety and health analyses that may be performed on a
project. This list can be used an aid to determine the specific activities that will be performed on a given
project. It is the responsibility of the Process Safety Specialist and Project Management to identify required
studies in the project scope. It is the responsibility of the Process Safety Specialist and the preliminary
hazards analysis team(s) to recommend or request additional studies that may be provide information to
further evaluate identified potential hazards.
a. Accidental Release Modeling Studies
b. Concurrent Operations Reviews
c. Constructability Hazard Analyses
d. Control & Safeguarding Philosophy
e. Emergency System Survivability Assessments
f. Equipment Sparing Philosophy and Optimization
g. Ergonomic Studies / Human Error Analyses
h. Evacuation, Escape & Rescue Analyses
i. Event Tree Analysis
j. Explosion Over-pressure Studies
k. Failure Mode and Effect Analyses
l. Fault Tree Analysis
m. Fire Protection Analyses
n. Fire Fighting & Rescue Plans
o. Hazard Register
p. Hazard and Operability Studies
q. Hazard and Risk Analyses
r. Hazardous Area Classification Reviews
s. Inherently Safer Design Reviews
t. Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
u. Loss Prevention Studies / Plans
v. Management of Change
w. Materials of Construction Reviews
x. Occupied Building Siting Studies
y. Offsite Consequence Analysis
z. Operations Philosophy
aa. P&ID Reviews
ab. Plot Plan Reviews
ac. Process Hazards Analysis
ad. Protection Philosophy
ae. Quantitative Risk Assessments
af. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability Analyses
ag. Safety Case Development / Reviews
ah. Safety Design and Integrity Reviews
ai. Safety and Operability on Electric Power Systems
aj. Safety Instrumented System Reviews
ak. Safety Specification Development and Review
al. Scenario-based Layout Reviews
am. Smoke Ingress Assessments
8. Plot Layout
8.1 Individual unit plot plans will be developed during basic engineering and will be in accordance with
appropriate standards including NFPA. Development of the overall facility plot plan will consider the
potential hazards associated with each unit and its effect upon adjoining units, roads, buildings, and third
party facilities. Facility and unit plot plan reviews shall be conducted with representation from the
engineering disciplines, operations, and process safety.
Required separation distances between operating buildings, service buildings, equipment, and storage
tanks are detailed in SABIC standard S01-G01, Safety Considerations for Plant Layout Levels.
The layout of the site will provide for continuous access to fire hydrants, fire monitors, and fire system
valves. A minimum of two access roads will be provided for fire trucks and emergency apparatus.
NFPA 30 will be used as the basis to determine layout of flammable liquid storage and unloading facilities
and design of flammable storage tanks.
Secondary containment (drainage or dikes) will be provided to contain spills and leaks of hazardous liquids.
Storage tanks for hazardous materials located outside the process units must have containment dikes or
impounding basins. Requirements for drainage and dikes can be found in NFPA 30.
Closed circuit television cameras will be provided for surveillance of the main plant gates. These cameras
will interface with a VCR to provide continuous recording of the gate traffic.
Other requirements of the overall plot plan are included in SABIC standard S01-G01, Safety
Considerations for Plant Layout Levels.
8.2 Equipment Spacing
Minimum spacing between process equipment will be determined using the spacing requirements provided
in SABIC standard S01-G01, Safety Considerations for Plant Layout Levels. This document is a guide for
distances between operating buildings, service buildings, equipment, and storage tanks. Spacing
distances will also consider specific unit hazards, fire fighting access, overpressure contours, and access
for maintenance/operations.
8.3 Scenario-based Layout Reviews
HVAC intake locations will be designed and built as specified by dispersion modeling of ’design cases’
chosen by a team of engineers with experience in the process under study.
All normally-occupied buildings will be designed and built to withstand expected overpressure as specified
by consequence modeling of a ’design case’ chosen by a team of engineers with experience in the process
under study.
API RP 752 shall be used as the guideline for identifying hazards that may affect process plant buildings
and for managing risks related to those hazards. The APIR RP 752 methodology is based on a relative risk
that should be considered in long-range planning on projects and for issues that involve building changes
(such as consolidation, office building replacements, etc.).
API 752 shall be used to identify the siting issues for process plant buildings. The Process Hazards
Analysis (PHA) is a mechanism that can be used to identify scenarios that could lead to a serious release
of a toxic or flammable material, or an explosion. API 752 provides decision trees for evaluating fire and
toxic release concerns, and a three-stage approach for evaluating explosions.
Attachment 1 outlines the following three-stage analysis approach for identifying hazards and managing
risk to building occupants from explosions:
a. Stage 1 identifies building for further investigation due to their proximity to processes which have
the potential for explosions and their occupancy level.
b. Stage 2 outlines three approaches that can be used to evaluate potential hazards to building
occupants:
c. Stage 3 outlines the use of qualitative and quantitative risk-assessment tools to perform a more
complex evaluation for buildings, coupled with proposals for reducing and controlling risk, where
warranted.
9. Fire Protection and Prevention
The goal of the facility fire protection system is the early detection and control of fire in order to minimize
fire potential, personnel injury, and equipment damage. The fire protection systems will consist of several
components including: fireproofing, detection systems, fire alarms, and fire water distribution/delivery
systems.
Fire detection and protection equipment will be FM-approved, UL-listed, or approved by a recognized
approving agency. Design and installation of all fire detection and protection equipment will conform to all fire protection standards listed in section 2.0. Additional fire protection system specifications and
guidelines can be found in SABIC standard F02-E01, Fire Protection Systems.
9.1 Detection Systems
The facility detection systems will include both flammable gas and fire detection capability. Flammable
gas detectors will be provided throughout the facility wherever flammable gas leaks or accumulation could
be expected, including compressor buildings. Flammable gas detection control panels in the central
control room will provide the location and description of the detected material. Smoke detectors will be
located in the control, rack, and electrical buildings. Manual pull stations will be located throughout the
process and utilities areas. In all cases, detectors will be designed to alarm to the DCS, and, in some
cases, activate fire protection or isolation systems. Additional specifications and guidelines can be found
in SABIC standard F01-G01, Fire and Gas Detection.
9.2 Fire Alarms
A facility-wide communication and emergency alarm system will be provided. Alarms and voice messages
will be audible throughout all areas under normal operating conditions. The alarm system will be activated
by manual pull stations or by the DCS operator. A PLC provided for activation of the horns, messages,
and lights will interface with the DCS to provide records of events and to inform the DCS of actions taken
in the plant. Emergency Communication Systems will meet the requirements of NFPA 72. Additional
specifications and guidelines can be found in SABIC standard F01-G01, Fire and Gas Detection.
9.3 Fire Water Distribution And Delivery System
Adequate and reliable sources of firewater supply shall be provided to ensure that water is available under
all circumstances. Firewater can be obtained from an unlimited source, such as a natural body of water, or
from a public/private water system. Fire pumps will be capable of delivering the maximum firewater
demand as set by the application rates used in analyzing the controlling ’design’ fire case for each project.
Sufficient spare pumps will be provided to ensure that the required firewater rate can be delivered without
regard to availability of electrical power.
Firewater will be distributed to the firewater equipment (sprinkler systems, monitors, and hydrants)
throughout the facility by a looped piping distribution network. This system will be designed with loops and
controlled by Post Indicator Valves so that any unit in the facility will continue to be protected in the event
of a line break. This firewater loop will conform to the requirements of NFPA 13.
Firewater will be delivered using a combination of hydrants, fixed monitors, deluge systems, and hose reel
stations. All fire equipment installations (including distances) must conform to NFPA 13 and NFPA 14.
Automatic sprinkler valves and valve houses will be located at or near the structure they protect. Feeder
lines and post indicator type sprinkler control valves will be furnished for each sprinkler system. The
maximum distance between PIVs should be 300 m.
Monitors will be designed for a combination fog-and-straight-stream nozzle and can be equipped with
either water nozzle or foam nozzle. Monitors will be located for accessibility, based on water stream
pressure, from the nearest hazard. When specific information of monitor nozzle is not available, a reach of
25 – 35 m can be used for spacing fire monitors. Fire hydrants will be spaced throughout the facility to
provide adequate coverage.
A complete line of mobile firefighting equipment will be provided to supplement the facility’s fixed
protection system. NFPA 10 will be followed.
SABIC standard F02-E01 for fire protection can be referenced for further guidelines and requirements.
9.4 Fireproofing
Fireproofing will be provided in all areas classified as fire hazard zones. Fireproofing will protect critical
power lines and control cables, piping associated with critical control valves, and support structures for
both piperacks and equipment. The fireproof coating will be applied at a thickness sufficient to withstand a
minimum of two hours of exposure to fire, unless otherwise dictated by project specifications or local
regulations. Structures supporting equipment shall be fireproofed from grade level to a height specified based on the type of equipment being supported. SABIC Standard F03-G01, Fire Protection for Buildings,
and SABIC Standard F02-E01, Fire Protection Systems, can be referenced for height specifications and
further information.
10. Emergency Shutdown System
The facility will be provided with an emergency shutdown (ESD) system designed to automatically bring
process units to a safe condition when a hazardous situation occurs. All equipment will stop and shutdown
valves will activate to a ’safe’ position.
Each unit will be provided with a unit shutdown button in the control room that will initiate the shutdown
sequence within that unit. Certain process equipment will be provided with automatic ESD systems that will
react to specific equipment conditions, including high pressure or temperature, fire, or gas detection. Each
individual shutdown system will be designed to react correctly to stop equipment and place valves in a safe
position. DCS logic will not allow restart until all conditions have been normalized. All ESD systems will
meet all requirements of ISA S-84.
11. Relief/Flare System Design
As the last level of protection against catastrophic vessel failure, safety relief devices will be sized and
installed in accordance with the same code as the vessel it protects (ASME/API). DIERS methodology or
equivalent will be used where there is a potential for two-phase flow or chemical reactions. The relief
devices will be sized to consider the ’worst case’ scenario as determined by a team of engineers
knowledgeable in the process under study. Potential failures include electrical failure, cooling water failure,
blocked discharge, hazardous polymerization, and fire. Appropriate industry standards, including API 520,
API 2000, and API 521 will be followed.
Relief valves will discharge to either atmosphere or a facility flare, depending on the feasibility of
containment. SABIC standard S-04-E-01, Venting and Atmospheric Relief, can be referenced for
atmospheric venting requirements. The flare stack will be of sufficient height and distances to meet radiant
heat exposure prevention requirements. The flare system will be designed to meet API 521.
The flare system will be provided with multiple knockout drums to eliminate liquid carryover and electronic
igniters/multiple pilots to ensure reliability/safety. The flare will be designed for smokeless operation.
SABIC Standard S-03-E-01, Pressure Relief, will govern the design of pressure relief systems.
12. SAFETY SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW
12.1 Project-Specific Standards and Specifications
The definiteness, scope and required adherence to standards can have an important effect on design
safety on a project. While standards represent the minimum quality and safety requirements, it is frequently
desirable to exceed minimum requirements if a cost benefit can be achieved. Industry codes and
standards provide guidelines while allowing for some flexibility in implementation and are frequently
referenced in corporate standards. Project specific standards should reflect these minimum requirements
as well as incorporate prudent measures to mitigate any specific or unique risks that may be present to an
individual project. Safety standards are to be adhered to by the disciplines and incorporated into project
specifications, as a means to ensure that the project safety goals and risk criteria are met.
Safety specifications for fire protection equipment, life saving appliances, fire proofing, fire fighting systems
are the responsibility of the process safety and fire protection specialists.
12.2 Review Process
Project specific standards and specifications developed by the process safety discipline shall be subject to
the project procedures and requirements for document control and squad checks by the other engineering
disciplines. The process safety discipline shall be included on squad check routing of engineering
documents for quality control purposes. The squad check function of the process safety lead or designee
is that of a reviewer of inherently safety design issues, mitigation, and control measures that have been
incorporated into project documents.
13. Other Considerations
The objective of the Process Safety and Loss Prevention discipline on a project is to execute tasks in a
manner that assists project management in meeting the overall goals of the project.
These overall goals generally include such “keys to success” as:
a. Reduction/elimination of re-work
b. Time/schedule efficiency
c. Satisfying the project’s need – not more, not less – to reduce capital costs
The Process Safety personnel can assist the project in meeting these objectives by structuring activities
as follows:
a. Identifying safety issues and hazards early in the design to lessen impact on the schedule,
b. Providing guidance to the disciplines so safety requirements can be included in the
specifications, reducing/eliminating re-work,
c. Tracking and follow-up on recommendations for closure and consistency.
Additional tasks and tools commonly used to perform process safety functions include the following:
a. Goal alignment – communication of project and corporate safety goals to project team members.
b. Safety Plan – scope of activities structured to meet the project safety goals. Describes the safety
activities on the project and the deliverables required from each activity.
c. Review of Design – review of P&IDs, electrical classification drawings, layout, etc. provided
through squad check reviews.
Table I on the following page lists generic safety goals, types of Process Safety activities used on a project
to help achieve that goal, and the benefit of the activity to the project. However, the main value of the
Process Safety Function is in the reduction of re-work realized from early identification of risk control
issues. Management of change keeps costs down in that the earlier in a project a change is made, the
less impact the change has on the total cost required to make the change.
TABLE I
Process Safety Activities for Capital Projects
APPENDIX A
Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings
BUILDING AND
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION (Stage 1)
APPENDIX A (Continued)
Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings
